

# AEVION QVenture — Investment Memo

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## TutorPath

AI Applications (vertical SaaS) · pre-seed · US · raising \$1,500,000

**Score 69.8/100 — WATCH (conviction: medium)**

### Investment memo

Verdict: a conditional yes, structured as a watch-list entry with a capped first check rather than a full-conviction lead. The single strongest reason for is a rare pre-seed combination of demonstrated learning outcomes (+0.8 grade-level) and paying district traction in a \$45B market growing 37%, all riding a genuine sector tailwind. The single strongest reason against is thin-wrapper risk against well-funded incumbents (Khan/Khanmigo, IXL, Carnegie Learning) who can bolt AI diagnosis onto existing distribution and bundle it toward zero—meaning value must provably accrue in the math-specific eval harness and misconception dataset, not the base model. Compounding this, the +0.8 gain lacks a control arm and may not survive an ESSA Tier II/III evaluation. Entry plan: lead with roughly \$657K for ~8% at a ~\$6.7M pre-money, hard-capping total exposure at \$750K, and reserve ~\$985K for pro-rata. Stage the check against two milestones: a controlled/RCT-grade efficacy signal and a disclosed pilot-to-paid conversion above 50%.

Narrative engine: live model (anthropic)

### Entry strategy

Ticket: \$657,024 target (range \$328,512–\$750,000)

Target ownership: 8%

Valuation band (pre-money): \$3,178,200 / \$6,712,800 / \$13,425,600

Return: 8.08x expected (24.6x base) · ~29.8% IRR over 8yr · loss prob 68%

#### Deployment schedule:

- 40% — Entry: On close, after founder + IP + cap-table diligence.
- 35% — Milestone: Product-market fit signal (retention cohort / first repeatable revenue).
- 25% — Pro-rata: Reserve for next priced round to defend ownership.

Portfolio: Size at ~2.5% of a diversified venture portfolio (fractional-Kelly, conviction-scaled). Reserve 985,536 USD for pro-rata follow-on.

### Score breakdown

#### Market size & growth — 55/100 (weight 20%)

~\$45B TAM, 37% CAGR (AI Applications (vertical SaaS)).

#### Timing / tailwinds — 100/100 (weight 10%)

Sector growth 37% vs. 12% neutral baseline.

#### Moat / defensibility — 74/100 (weight 15%)

Dominant defensibility here: switching costs.

#### Unit economics potential — 69/100 (weight 15%)

~70% mature gross margin, capital intensity 35%.

#### Team / execution signal — 58/100 (weight 12%)

commercial validation cited

#### Scientific / tech feasibility — 100/100 (weight 10%)

agentic workflows, domain eval harnesses, retrieval + tool orchestration

#### Regulatory / legal headroom — 74/100 (weight 9%)

Regulatory intensity 40% (higher = more legal drag).

#### Competitive headroom — 41/100 (weight 9%)

Competitive intensity 85%. thin wrapper risk — value must accrue above the model layer.

## Analyst council

### Research Scientist — Misconception-diagnosis math tutor with real district traction; core claim (+0.8 grade-level) needs rigorous validation before defensibility holds

+ The scientific frontier for misconception diagnosis is well-grounded: knowledge-tracing (BKT/DKT), Q-matrix/cognitive diagnostic models, and error-pattern analysis have 30+ years of research. Buggy-rules for arithmetic/algebra misconceptions (e.g., DeBRA, ASSISTments studies) are documented — this is not hand-wavy, but the hard part is reliable inference of WHICH misconception from sparse wrong an

+ Traction is genuinely differentiating for pre-seed: 3 paid districts + 4,200 active students shows procurement clearance (a real barrier). But the +0.8 grade-level claim from one semester lacks a control group — needs a matched-comparison or RCT-style design; single-pilot gains routinely regress and are confounded by teacher enthusiasm/Hawthorne effects.

+ Defensibility must accrue above the LLM: the durable asset is a labeled misconception taxonomy + longitudinal response dataset (per-item error tags) that trains a diagnostic model competitors can't cheaply replicate. If diagnosis is just LLM prompting over wrong answers, it's a thin wrapper — GPT-class models can approximate this, collapsing the moat to switching costs and district relationships o

+ Domain eval harness is the technical crux and an underrated de-risker: they need a benchmark measuring diagnostic accuracy (did we identify the correct misconception vs. expert-labeled ground truth?), not just answer-generation quality. Ability to show >80% agreement with expert diagnostic labels would materially validate the core IP.

! Efficacy evidence is anecdotal — +0.8 grade-level with no control arm may not survive an ESSA Tier II/III evaluation, which districts increasingly demand for intervention funding; a null RCT result would be existential.

! Thin-wrapper risk: if diagnosis quality is largely inherited from the base LLM, foundation-model improvements and well-funded incumbents (Khan/Khanmigo, IXL, Carnegie Learning MATHia with an established cognitive-tutor moat) commoditize the offering.

! Sales cycle and budget dependency: district procurement is 6-18 months with concentrated funding (ESSER cliff already passed), so CAC and cash runway on a \$1.5M raise are tight against a long, seasonal buying calendar.

### Data Analyst — TutorPath shows real learning outcomes but faces brutal edtech sales cycles and thin-wrapper risk at pre-seed

+ TAM framing is inflated: \$45B vertical SaaS TAM is not addressable — US K-12 math intervention SaaS SAM is closer to \$1-3B (~15M HS math students, ~\$50-150/student/yr district budgets). SOM at pre-seed is a few hundred districts; realistic near-term ARR ceiling is single-digit millions.

+ Outcome signal is the strongest asset: +0.8 grade-level gain in one semester is materially above typical intervention effect sizes — but n=1 largest pilot, no control group, and no info on cohort baseline. This metric confirms or kills the thesis; demand a randomized/matched-control replication across "e3 districts.

+ Unit economics are unproven, not modeled: ~70% mature gross margin is plausible but LLM inference cost per active student is undisclosed — at 4,200 students, per-seat compute could compress margin below 50% if diagnosis uses frequent model calls. No CAC/LTV data; district sales cycles run 6-18 months with CAC often \$20-50k per district, implying multi-year payback.

+ Moat via switching costs is optimistic for a wrapper: diagnosis-of-misconception is the defensible IP if it's a proprietary eval harness / labeled error taxonomy, but if it's prompt-engineering on a foundation model, Khanmigo/IXL/incumbents replicate it. Value must accrue in the pedagogical data layer, not the model.

! Procurement & budget risk: district budgets are seasonal, grant-dependent (ESSER funds expired Sept 2024), and slow — 3 pilots may not convert to renewals, and pilot-to-paid conversion rate is undisclosed (the key kill metric).

! Thin-wrapper competitive risk: 85% competitive intensity with well-funded incumbents (Khan Academy, IXL, Carnegie Learning) who can bolt on AI diagnosis; no defensible data moat demonstrated yet.

! Efficacy generalization risk: the +0.8 gain lacks a control group and may reflect selection/Hawthorne effects; if replication fails, the core value prop and district willingness-to-pay collapse.

### Economist — Efficacious math-intervention SaaS with real learning gains, but sold into a slow, budget-constrained buyer facing thin-wrapper competition

+ Demand is inelastic where it matters: districts buy under Title I / ESSA intervention mandates, and a documented +0.8 grade-level gain is a rare efficacy signal that justifies premium pricing (\$20-40/student/yr) — but demand is highly seasonal and gated by 6-18 month procurement cycles.

+ Moat is switching-cost-driven, not model-driven: value accrues from the proprietary misconception-diagnosis layer and accumulated student error data, not the LLM. The defensible asset is a labeled corpus of wrong-answer taxonomies + eval harness, which compounds with usage (weak network effect, strong data flywheel).

+ Unit economics are attractive at ~70% mature gross margin, but pre-seed CAC into districts is brutal — long sales cycles, RFPs, and pilot-to-paid conversion risk mean burn is front-loaded; 3 pilots / 4,200 students is validation, not a repeatable motion.

+ Macro-sensitive revenue: district edtech budgets are pro-cyclical and were inflated by ~\$190B ESSER federal funds that expired Sept 2024 — the biggest near-term headwind is the post-ESSER funding cliff, which is already compressing district discretionary spend.

! Thin-wrapper erosion: if foundation models add native step-by-step diagnostic reasoning, the core misconception-detection edge commoditizes; durable rent requires the eval harness + math-specific data to stay ahead of general-model capability.

! Buyer concentration + budget cliff: reliance on district budgets post-ESSER means sales cycles could lengthen

and pricing compress; incumbents (IXL, Khan/Khanmigo, DreamBox/Discovery) have distribution and can bundle for free or near-zero.

! Efficacy generalization risk: +0.8 grade-level gain is from one pilot cohort — regression to mean, selection effects, and lack of RCT rigor could undermine the central sales claim under district procurement scrutiny.

### **Corporate & Regulatory Lawyer — Regulatory intensity 40% — legal headroom 74/100.**

+ Regulatory drag factor: intensity 40%.

+ Confirm IP ownership and freedom-to-operate.

+ Structure entry with pro-rata rights, information rights, and standard downside protection.

! Jurisdiction-specific licensing / compliance not yet verified.

! IP, data-privacy, and liability exposure require counsel review.

### **Market data sources**

• Grand View Research (2025) — Generative AI \$22.2B in 2025, 37.6% CAGR to 2030

<https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/generative-ai-market-report>

• ABI Research (2025) — Gen-AI software \$63B in 2025 !' ~\$220B by 2030 at ~29% CAGR

<https://www.abiresearch.com/blog/generative-ai-software-market-report-summary>

### **Assumptions & limitations**

• Market size / growth for AI Applications (vertical SaaS) is anchored to Grand View Research (2025): Generative AI \$22.2B in 2025, 37.6% CAGR to 2030. Full citations are listed under "Market data sources".

• Stage norms reflect US-market pre-seed deals; adjust for geography "US".

• Score is a screening signal, not a substitute for legal, financial, and technical due diligence.

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